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Thank you very much for attending.  I am delighted to see so many people here, so I guess 
the suspense has worked.  It’s true I have been at the university for some time, more than 
four years, and joined as a Professor, having been made one at BCU in 2010, so this 
evening is long overdue.  In my defence there were a number of things that have forced its 
postponement: when I joined Greenwich in January 2013 I had a book contract on which the 
deadline was fast approaching, and then soon after arriving there appeared the opportunity 
to be involved with the development of this magnificent building, then there was an argument 
to be put about the place of art, design and creative practice inside it and how the university 
would cope with this more generally.  This was followed by the reality of consequences that I 
had put in motion: founding a new department in the midst of a restructuring of the 
university, moving it into a new building, developing its culture and seeing to its many needs 
has given plenty of reasons to put today off until things settled down, or at least that was the 
plan.  When we started I recall telling colleagues that new buildings don’t solve your existing 
problems, they simply eliminate them.  The trouble is they also give you a whole lot of new 
ones that hadn’t considered before, and thus it has been with the establishment of Creative 
Professions and Digital Arts here in Stockwell Street.  At the very least I can say, after 
forcing the university community to wait so long for the pearls of professorial wisdom you are 
about to hear, that it has been my privilege to have had responsibility for sorting them out.  In 
the process I have been able to work with some outstanding people whose only fault, in my 
view, is that of modesty.  I am grateful for their support and enthusiasm in dismantling most 
of the former structures in which they worked.  I have also been lucky enough to have 
augmented the staff base at CPDA, appointing some richly talented academics, some to 
their first permanent post in Higher Education.  They have brought energy, quality, talent and 
focus to the department.  As a staffing group I would acknowledge their tenacity in facing 
down some of our problems: excellence is not achieved by rhetoric or policy or regulation: it 
is created by commitment and hard work, following through an idea to its logical conclusion, 
taking into account the riskiness of the proposition and betting on yourself and your 
colleagues to see it through.  On our first day of proper business for our department, which 
happened to be the first day we moved into the building and also the first day of a new 
academic year, we all started with brand new jobs, including me.  So it has certainly been a 
learning process, and I am obliged to them all for bearing with me whilst I worked out what it 
was I supposed to do and how I was supposed to do it, and I hope I have helped them to 
understand what their jobs were in turn.  The results, as ever in creative practice, ultimately, 
must speak for themselves: I will happily remind everyone that the CPDA end-of-year show 
is here in this building on Wednesday, June 14th, and that what we have seen over the past 
three years of occupation is a steady improvement in the standard and ambitions of our 
undergraduates across the disciplines in which we teach.  It has always been our aim that 
our students should do more than simply pass through our hands into the world: they should 
emerge from our programmes as capable and creative professionals in an increasingly 
competitive environment.  This requires more than a knowledge of photoshop, how to pull 
focus or understand narrative structure, important as those things are. 
 
Tonight goes some special thanks to some of my colleagues for their contribution to this 
evening.  In particular, Dr. Stephen Kennedy who has persistently harassed me to have this 
event for about three years now.  Jan Tovey and Andrew Hill, who have collaborated on this 
and on the 360 degree film we finished shooting on Monday deserve plenty of praise for 
saddling me with the obligation to go through with it.  Thanks also to our tech team for 
finding all kinds of obscure kit we had somewhere or other and supporting this event and the 
tech requirements for the film, and the Masters students, Athip and Nop, for assisting 
tonight, but also on Monday where the main research work for this as a longer term project 
was done at the Culture Space in Canada Water.  Ekaterina Sporton was both patient and 
skilled in designing and making the costumes, and many of my colleagues covered me 
during the rehearsal process.  The greatest thanks of course must go to Sandra Norman, 
who was come more than 12,000 miles and across more than thirty years to volunteer for 
this unlikely project.  More about her (and it) later on, but it is time to begin. 
 
Dancers generally are puzzled (and marginalised) by one of the key cultural premises of 
Western civilisation.  They struggle to conform to it in their everyday existence, but the 
persistence of this idea in culture generally makes them outsiders to that culture, and 
explains their appearance on the periphery of society.  The insistence that the cultural 
assumptions applying to the body must apply to them is the theme of this lecture.  Dancers 
are not alone in experiencing this bewilderment: they are merely the group I know best who 
suffer a fundamental misunderstanding of their experience and often have it played pack to 
them in shapes and narratives that they do not recognise.  They are more prone, vulnerable 
even, to having their experience explained, talked about in their own presence as if in the 
third person, than other groups experiencing something similar.  It isn’t that this phenomena 
has gone unnoticed: (I have used the word deliberately) it definitely hasn’t as I will show 
presently: there have been an number of onlookers interested in identifying it, but the prism 
through which dance as a body practice is viewed refracts their reality into a spectrum 
limited by the culture of which they are meant to be a part. The very identification of a 
problem in this regard demands reconfiguration of phenomena into the comprehensible, and 
it is the habit of doing so against a particular intellectual tradition that I am seeking to 
challenge this evening. 
 
It starts with Descartes.  He was in pursuit of an explanation about existence, inspired by the 
mathematics at which he was so adept, and started off as a younger man with the 
challenging idea that our fate (our certain death) was determined by our imagination or lack 
thereof, that we died because we had an expectation of doing so.  His early speculations on 
this matter are often dismissed, though to me it seems this particular idea led him to the one 
for which he is most famous: Cartesian dualism, or the mind-body problem.  The Cogito, ‘I 
think, therefore I am’.  This aphorism has forever privileged the intellectual over the body, 
implied (though Descartes might be horrified at the uses of his work) that the formulation of 
existence and experience ought to be the preserve of the mind.  Intellectual conception was 
the only guarantee of a truthful assertion, the very formation of the proposition is what makes 
the proposition true. In itself, it becomes an extension of much older ideas in intellectual 
culture about the unobserved life not worth living (attributed to Socrates and that comes to 
us via Plato), or the agonies of Augustine: ‘Give me chastity and continence, but not yet.’  In 
themselves they sum up the dilemma of the intellectual when faced with the realities of the 
body: in all cases, their solution has been to separate the physical from the rest of their 
existence, ordering matters as required by the intellect, assuming that the power to propose 
is equal to the power to exist.  This is a very interesting thought, and one that inspires the 
noospherians, those who think our future will be in uploading ourselves into some kind of 
cosmic internet and relieving ourselves of the demands of the body in doing so.  I suspect, 
that were this even possible one day, the permanent deferral of death might result in some 
exceptional procrastination.   
 
Vico, quite antithetical to this in his concept of knowing, founded his ideas on memory or 
imagination and locating such knowing in the realm of the mind, acknowledged the 
possibility that to get there might take participation in an activity that produces qualitative 
outcomes: this is the realm not of the creative but of the critical intellectual.  This short 
allusion is not a justification of what comes next, merely a touchstone of a premise that 
needs fleshing out.  I remain perfectly comfortable about how the history of ideas evolves in 
its own domain, and this is not so wide ranging a critique of this to make a more strident 
claim that such a history lacks the unity of the person.  My concern is the point where such 
ideas spill out, uncontrolled and poorly understood, into the domain of the physical.          
 
I might start at the obvious limitation of seeking understanding through a life already divided 
between the comforts of intellectuality and the realities of physicality as a contingent 
process.  Quite simply, the mode in which the intellectual engages with the body requires 
more than the limited expressive power of thinking.  Dance isn’t intellectual process by other 
means, and intellectual inquiry in other art forms invariably acknowledges this truth: if it could 
be formulated in words, then it requires no art.  However, in much of the rest of the arts the 
emphasis is on what is produced rather than how (I think especially of music and the 
complexities of the how, that often remain unremarked upon).  Dance depends on a body to 
represent it, and the movement of synapses is an inadequate substitution.  The hubris 
demanded for offering an account of the body by someone of such limited experience of it 
and whose method of development of the concept is desk-bound seems remarkable.  A 
clear preference for the life of the mind cannot possibly be the basis of an authoritative 
account of the body even if, as intellectuals are want to do, you accept Cartesian dualism as 
the basis of existence and the only possible point of departure.  I will return to this later, 
noting that some of those I am about to disparage have at least glimpsed the foothills of this 
problem, but they have dealt with it in an entirely intellectual way, whilst making claim to 
speak for the physical. This doesn’t even make sense in Cartesian terms.  It turns out that 
minds and ideas can evolve, but bodies often can’t: the body referred to in the abstract is 
always the same body, and that body is only a concept.  The ideas have a life of their own 
that is happily denied the very vessel of the existence they think they are experiencing or 
explaining.    
 
I suspect this general privileging of the mind is why dancers see themselves outside of 
society and often have problems associating outside their own closed circles of social 
experience.  Many years ago, when I was first looking at the literature around intellectual 
enquiry into dance, I repeatedly found the irreconcilable propositions of dance; as innate to 
human experience on the one hand and dance as a marginalised cultural practice on the 
other repeated in the impenetrable and serial bunglings of dance academics.  They were 
seeking to express the difficulties of holding the two contradictory propositions 
simultaneously, without the insight or intellectual heft to make such propositions stick.  This 
wasn’t their only problem: dance was cited as both an expression of primitive urges and a 
construct of culture; dancers were both horribly brutalised and symbols of freedom, 
choreographers were the last word in authorship but dancers could not be distinguished, 
Yeats’ style, from the substance of the dance.  The examples are many, and the damning 
conclusion that one comes to is that, as yet, no seriously intelligent person has ever thought 
deeply enough about dance to give it an intellectual framework that has stuck.  I 
acknowledge the contributions of some tremendous reviewers like Arlene Croce or Edwin 
Denby, some cultural specialists like Kirstein or more latterly Mark Franko, historians like the 
ever meticulous Slonimsky, but dance still waits, will go on waiting for its Gombrich or 
Panofsky to give it its theoreticians, or for a Brecht, Stanislavsky or Augusto Boal as master 
maker/thinkers, or an Adorno who could make claim to complex understanding of culture as 
a whole through a mind beautifully trained in musical composition. Laura Mulvey is first and 
foremost a filmmaker. Even digital technology has Jaron Lanier.  For dance, this will never 
happen, and the why requires an explanation. 
 
In the absence of such groundwork, those who have thought about dance have resorted to 
the authority of those who have thought about the body.  There have, indeed, been a 
plethora of them, especially in the 20th century, and the names of Foucault, Merleau-Ponty 
or Deleuze and Guattari feature heavily in intellectual accounts of the body as it engages 
with dance.  The limitations of such thinkers on the body have been pointed out many times: 
their inability to escape the legacy of Cartesian dualism left them confecting ever more 
unlikely realities about the body.    These, like the Social Constructivist thinking emerging 
from Foucault’s work, for instance, discredit them as having little more than a passing 
interest in the body except as it could be proposed as an extension of social forces (thus 
managing, in a moment of supposed insight and reordering of priorities, to reduce the body 
to its previous invisibility).  The alternative has been the psychological imperative. As 
Heidegger jibed about Sartre, Ricoeur and others, “The French psychologists also 
misinterpret everything as an expression of something interior instead of seeing the 
phenomenon of the body in the context by which men are in relationship to each other”.  We 
are, really in a dance with the rest of society, and we are not the choreogapher.  Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of the phenomenological restricts bodily experiences to that which can be 
described, turning his propositions into something akin to Schrodinger's cat.  Should the 
knowledge of dance, in Vico’s sense of something experienced, imagined and remembered 
be as impossible as all that?   
 
Being beguiled by continental philosophy might not prove much of a starting point for an 
understanding of dance and its challenging manifestations. The extension of enquiry into 
spectatorship, using borrowed ideas from the cinema is equally problematic.  Mutatis 
mutandis, the exercise only results in reinforcing some conventional identity politics: the 
male gaze apparently dominating an artform where not only are most of the performers 
female, but most of the audience are as well. Rather than dig out the complexities that might 
make it so, and make it so popular that academics may make a career from observing it, I 
am repeatedly shocked at the extent to which the gauze of a predetermined view is applied 
to the phenomenon in front of it, using the gaze as a pretext.  This is rarely argued but often 
asserted: ‘it isn’t my body being represented’ writes one, determined not to be seduced by 
the charms of the performance.  Quite a lot of baggage being taken into the theatre there, I 
suspect. Projection onto the action of sexual preference is disguised by apparent enquiry 
into the ambiguous role of the male in dance, especially Western dance and especially 
ballet.  Yet this seems to belong to a distant era of intolerance and prejudice, distracting from 
what other qualities might be available to an astute observer not expressly seeking a 
reinforcement of their personal convictions.  Notwithstanding the poor quality of this activity 
as intellectual enquiry, it seems difficult to hope for much insight from such undercritical 
approaches.  What then is the responsibility of the intellectual in formulating a notion about 
the body? 
 
In the first place, it might be useful to identify some of the prejudices being displayed.  The 
first, and most important to acknowledge, is the profound and unshakeable belief that 
enquiry of this sort could leave us with a comprehensive understanding about the 
phenomena in the first place, noting its story would be, by virtue of Descartes, that of the 
body rather than of a holistic phenomenon.  In other words, such enterprises are doomed 
from the start, given the unsuitability of the material to the method and the experience of the 
enquirer.  It is time to humbly express the limitations of the intellectual when giving an 
account of experience that is fundamentally discordant with their world-view.  At best, it is 
partial in both senses of the word.  It has a home-team bias, and it can only deal with a 
fraction of the whole.  This suggests I have an idea about recasting the role of the intellectual 
in this context, and I certainly do. 
 
The real opportunity to understand the body looks more like Vico than Foucault.  To quote 
Isaiah Berlin, ‘Vico’s central point is that poetic feeling which must ‘plunge deep into 
particulars’, cannot exist when people think in concepts.’  For Vico, inspired singers (and to 
Vico, Homer’s voice is the greatest example), cannot coexist with philosophers and do not 
need to.  This does not preclude appreciation: it changes the context of it into one that seeks 
to understand the origins of its power, and to accept a context where the critical intellect is 
inevitably accompanied by the loss of imaginative force.  Dance helps us because it sets us 
outside the intellectual in our response.  Mallarme, the symbolist poet, was wrong when 
saying of Loie Fuller that she was ‘writing with her body’.  She was doing nothing of the sort: 
she was dancing and he was writing about her.  The symbiotic relationship between dancer 
and dance that Yeats spoke of was perhaps closest to an analysis of the problem that we 
have yet seen.   
 
I want to speak briefly then about the process of dancing, something that I have done very 
little of for the past 15 years prior to this project.  You deserve an explanation of why I have 
offered this as an inaugural event.  You are about to see a dance from thirty years ago 
performed by the same people who did it then.  Or not, as the case may be, as neither 
myself nor Sandra Norman, my partner in this evening’s performance, could make much of a 
claim to being or doing what we were then.  The idea was first raised when the small dance 
company we both worked for more than three decades ago was having its 30th anniversary, 
and Sandra was recruited to contact all the former dancers across the decades.  When it 
came to me there must have been some bittersweet memories for both of us: we were never 
particularly close, and we were both very focussed, ambitious young dancers, but (essential 
to this project, actually), people change, our destinies as dancers and as people continued.  
Once contacted, I rifled through the few relics I have of my performing career.  There isn’t 
much, considering the international context of it, and the fact that dancers aren’t paid enough 
to carry an archive around with them.  Surprisingly, I was still in possession of some 
videotapes, and I had our tech team convert them.   
 
What emerged was a highlight, for both Sandra and myself.  A short, ten-minute duet of a 
fractious relationship set to sentimental music from long forgotten operettas.  I sent the video 
back to New Zealand with the warning that it looked good enough to revisit, but I wasn’t 
especially serious.  It was only when, looking at the freshness of the choreography and the 
weight of its themes, it occurred to both of us that whilst a reconstruction could (and should) 
be ruled out, there might still be another dance waiting for us inside this one.   
 
I am grateful to Sandra for making the journey here and enduring three weeks of rehearsals, 
as we both nursed our long-standing wounds from performance careers whilst seeking 
something new from the dance.  There are two main observations to be shared with you 
about this.  For an artform that all too often appears to celebrate youth and vitality, it is worth 
understanding and observing the passage of the body through a succession of states.  The 
dancing happens within a framework of circumstances, one of which is the unreliability of the 
body and our memory of it through time.  As Foucault noted, it is important to be clear in the 
history of ideas about whom you are speaking.  The big question he raises in discussions 
about Marxism is which Marx we might now be talking about.  It matters.  If this is true for the 
process of ideas, noting this is usually only linear in retrospect, it is an almost unavoidable 
truth for two dancers who last performed this work 31 years ago.  The weight of time 
contrasts the challenges of today with the ease of the past.  Our destinies are not simply 
physical ones, but are about how we have moved along with time in all the aspects of our 
human experience.  This is expressly a theme of this performance: this isn’t about trying to 
relive the past or an inability to put that past behind us.  Rather, it has been an opportunity to 
revisit the theme of the earlier dance and ask how the passage of ourselves through time 
might enrich a precocious work performed by people with, at that stage, their lives ahead of 
them.     
 
I have argued earlier that intellectuals sometimes think they are the only ones with a 
franchise on the validity of ideas because the manifestations of dance sometimes seem to 
look just the way they always did.  That indicates how little attention they are paying to the 
phenomenon in front of them.  Most choreographers, and all dancers, understand how 
fragile those manifestations are.  They are fundamentally contingent.  Without wishing to be 
drawn further into the failings of the history of intellectual enquiry into dance, one of the 
others is the preoccupation with positing dances as text (hence my reference to Mallarme 
earlier).  Most published, written texts demonstrate some sort of stability, and writers and 
editors worry over them given the permanence and authority of the printed word.  A new 
edition or translation can’t alter the substance of a work and still be thought of as the same.  
In dance performance, this isn’t true.  What is true is that rehearsal will build up particular 
habits of going about producing a performance, but as the proverb says, you never step into 
the same river twice, and that is the reality of performing a dance.   
 
The rehearsal process has been full of surprises for us.  After all, we hadn’t met for thirty 
years in the first place.  But it was remarkable how quickly we resumed.  Some parts of the 
dance were easy enough to learn again, indeed where we got some sections wrong our own 
bodies were reliable guides to setting ourselves straight or demanding an adaptation.  We 
both recall the performances where the videos we worked from were made: we had a fight 
before one of them, and before another we were so cool about performing this within a very 
long programme we thought of it as a rest along the way.  By that stage we were engaged in 
the best mode of performing any dance, the one where the dance does itself through you.  
This takes tremendous focus, and I suspect is no different to professional athletes or 
musicians.  You work towards a point where you are able to find a place where thinking is 
unnecessary and even distracting, that, no matter what exertions are demanded, you 
perform through the dance, you become it and that defies intellectual process. 
  
I am reminded by the way one dance academic dismisses this idea.  ‘Dancers’, she says, 
‘describe this as the body knowing, but this doesn’t help us at all’.  She is obliquely 
suggesting the intellectual limitations of dancers, who seem to her too inarticulate to give her 
the answer that she wants: an explanation that fits her world view of dancers, especially 
ballet dancers, as manipulated yet powerful, a typical paradox of the dance academic who 
sees Foucaultian power structures everywhere but cannot help acknowledging their 
transcendence by the actions of a well trained dancer just doing their job on stage.  Being so 
distracted she has missed a quintessential reality of the dancer’s experience.  This is entirely 
the reverse of being inarticulate, if I may play a little game with words, as the joints and 
sinews create through action something defying conversion into text.  These are the 
conditions where the dancer does their best work.  It is not an act of stupidity, but of balance: 
ignoring the focus on the head into the whole corporeal experience and allowing the 
performance to happen.  When Sandra Norman says to me in rehearsals that you can’t think 
and breathe at the same time, I understand exactly what she is saying: there is a 
performance state that requires proper focus on how the whole of the dance manifests, and 
interrupting this with commentary distorts and disfigures the intent.  In this process I have 
found myself wanting in this regard.   All too often my long-standing retirement from the 
stage does not reveal itself in rehearsal as rusty virtuosity, rather it has shown me an 
inability to connect my physicality to the doing of a dance.  This is not a function of age, but 
of a kind of focus.  I simply no longer have the intensity and single-purposedness required to 
give justice to the full demands made by the dancing.  I sense my disconnection from that 
state of grace that dancers seek, of allowing the dance to unfold itself.  My technical 
shortcomings that translate into incompetence are the result of a long period lived in the 
pursuit of goals beyond a great performance.  You cannot just step back into the river. 
 
This sobering thought brings me back to my earlier promise to explain why dance and its 
intellectuals can never be reconciled.  There is a gulf of mutual incomprehensibility that goes 
beyond Cartesian dualism: after all, only one side is affected by it.  For the other, it is the 
integration of the whole that is the starting point of the enterprise.  The challenge of 
explaining it faces both the inadequacy of words and their pointlessness.              
 
If I am right then philosophy-based enquiry into dance is the wrong place to start.  This has 
distracted and detracted from improving our appreciation of how the body is integrated into 
the mechanism: as someone might have reminded Descartes about the body, he should try 
formulating a concept without one.  Dance, because it attracts so much attention can tell us 
much more about ourselves if we avoid resorting to the use of such unsuitable tools.  The 
locus of knowledge of dance is found in the doing of it, and that is exactly what we are about 
to do.  
     
